2026년 10월 16일 금요일

Natural disasters (천재지변)

 


In the analysis of "financial capacity to pay interest," it has been suggested that if a country exhausts its room for interest rate adjustments—or faces excessive inflation—its capacity to meet interest payments could vanish even before interest rates reach zero, potentially triggering a crisis akin to the Great Depression of 1929.

Given the current state of monetary policy in the Eurozone, countries with limited room for interest rate adjustments—such as Switzerland, China, Thailand, Japan, Taiwan, Singapore, Denmark, and Sweden—are particularly vulnerable. As they face rising prices driven by surging oil and natural gas costs, these nations risk a crisis stemming from the exhaustion of their financial capacity to pay interest.

However, there is a saying: "If you can't have the best, make the best of what you have."

Even if a future crisis—characterized by the depletion or exhaustion of the financial capacity to pay interest—appears inevitable, there may still be a way to overcome, reverse, or at least delay such a crisis. That solution lies in "natural disasters."

From a macroeconomic perspective, natural disasters can lead to an increase in interest-rate-related liquidity. Furthermore, they drastically reduce the consumption of money within the total money supply, effectively creating a deflationary environment. To put it simply: if a region—accounting for 30% of a nation’s total GDP—were to suffer a collapse of its economy due to a natural disaster, the consumption of currency and the rate of liquidity circulation in that area would plummet. Depending on the severity of the damage, this could—either permanently or for a significant duration—stave off the exhaustion of a nation’s interest-rate-based policy options and its capacity to meet fiscal interest obligations.

Therefore, even if a future crisis in monetary policy—driven by the depletion of interest-rate levers—appears inevitable, such a disaster—while unfortunate for the affected region—could paradoxically provide the nation’s monetary policy environment with an opportunity to escape that crisis.

The issue, however, is that typical natural disasters—such as typhoons, earthquakes, tsunamis, floods, or droughts—exert a deflationary pressure on liquidity that is merely temporary, not permanent.

Yet, there exists a specific type of "natural disaster" that could bring about a permanent increase in liquidity: a rise in sea levels.Because the rise in sea levels is not a transient event but a permanent one, it functions—from the perspective of preventing the collapse of the macroeconomic monetary system and extending its lifespan—as an almost essential mechanism.

The important thing is whether humans possess the scientific and technological capabilities to control natural phenomena, and since this part determines whether extraterrestrial beings from advanced civilizations ahead of Earth's civilization participated—a matter of conspiracy theory—it falls into an unknown realm of knowledge that we do not know. Ultimately, even when there is little room left for interest rate adjustments within the realm of monetary policy—and even as the economy nears the threshold of a Great Depression—there is always a solution to be found, much like the old saying: "If you can't have the best, make the best of what you have."



원문

Financial capacity to pay interest.(재정적 이자지급능력) 의 분석에서, 금리여력고갈또는 과도한인플레이션으로 인해서 제로금리이전에 재정적 이자지급능력이 고갈으로  1929년 대공황과 같은 상황이 발생한다고했습니다.

현재 , 유로존 금리를  정상적인 통화정책환경으로 볼때 ,  스위스,중국,태국,일본,타이완,싱가폴,덴마크,스웨덴같은 금리여력이 낮은 국가들이 , 본격적인 유가상승과 천연가스의 가격상승으로 만들어지는 물가상승시기에 재정적 이자지급능력고갈로  먼저 위기가 올수밖에 없는상황에 놓여있다고했습니다.

하지만,

"이가 없으면 잇몸으로 산다." (한국속담)

속담에 이런 말이 있는데,  미래의 현실(재정적 이자지급능력소진및고갈)이  정해져있고 위기가 다가온다 하더라도, 

이를 극복하려 노력한다면  위기상황을 반전시키셔 지연시킬수있는 해법이 존재한다는것입니다.

그 해답이 바로  천재지변입니다.

천재지변은  거시경제상  금리적 유동성 증가 효과를 가지고있다는것이고,  총통화량의 화폐소비량을 극적으로 줄여서  디플레이션환경을 만든다는것입니다.

이해하기 쉽게 설명하면,  

한국가의 총GDP에  30%만큼 해당지역에  천재지변이 발생해서  경제가 붕괴했다면 이지역에서 사용될  화폐소비량및 유동성의소비율이 줄어들게되어서 

금리적여력고갈및  재정적 이자지급능력소진을  피해정도에 따라서 영구적또는일정시간동안 지연시킬수있게됩니다.

 따라서, 미래 통화정책적 위기가  금리여력고갈로  이미 정해져 있다 하더라도 , 피해지역에는 불운이지만 이를 통해 국가의 통화정책환경이 위기에서 탈출할수있는 기회가 올수도 있다는것입니다. 

문제는  태풍,지진, 쓰나미, 홍수,가뭄등등의 일반적인 천재지변으론  유동성증가효과의 디플레이션 영향력이   일시적이며  영원하지않다는것입니다.

하지만, 

이를 극복할수있는  영구적인 유동성증가효과를 가진  천재지변이  궁극적으로 나타나는데, 그것이 바로  " 해수면상승" 입니다.

해수면 상승의 천재지변은  일시적이지않으며  그효과가  영구적이기때문에  거시경제상에서의 "화폐경제시스템의 붕괴예방과 수명연장측면"에서       

반드시 필요한 수단에 가깝다는것입니다. 

중요한것은 

인간이 자연현상을 좌지우지할 정도의  과학기술력을 가지고있냐는것이고, 이부분부터  음모론적으로 지구문명보다 앞선 선진문명의 외계인 참여여부가 결정되기때문에  우리가 알지못하는 미지의 지식영역에 해당하게됩니다.

결과적으로  통화정책영역에서 아무리 금리여력이 부족하고 대공황진입이 가깝다 하더라도,

한국속담의 "이가 없으면 잇몸으로 산다." 과 같은 해법은 늘 존재한다 하겠습니다......


2026년 10월 15일 목요일

Financial capacity to pay interest.(재정적 이자지급능력)

 


Theoretically, the lower bound for interest rates that a central bank can set is zero.

In the context of a monetary system, a zero-interest-rate environment represents a point where a nation’s fiscal capacity to make interest payments is completely exhausted.

The catch is that only nations with highly sophisticated central banking and advanced monetary policy frameworks are capable of reaching this zero-interest-rate threshold.

Let’s look at an example.

Government bond yields relate to the money supply (liquidity), while policy interest rates relate to inflation (as measured by the Consumer Price Index, or CPI).

When the level of inflation (policy rate) is appropriate relative to the money supply (government bond yield), a nation’s fiscal capacity remains sufficient to sustain interest payments even as rates approach zero.

However,

if inflation (policy rate) exceeds what is justified by the money supply (government bond yield), the nation’s fiscal capacity will be depleted by inflation long before it can ever reach a zero-interest-rate state.

Currently, China’s government bond yield (reflecting money supply) is 1.67%, while its policy interest rate (reflecting inflation) is 3.0%.

Even if China possesses the fiscal headroom to reach a zero-interest-rate environment, the excess inflation erodes purchasing power and reduces liquidity. Consequently, the "effectively available" government bond yield becomes 1.67% minus the 1.33% excess, resulting in an effective yield of 0.33%.

Therefore, if China’s government bond yields were to fall by another 0.33%, the country would reach the zero-interest-rate threshold—the point at which its fiscal capacity to meet interest obligations is entirely exhausted. 


The chart displays data on government bond yields and policy interest rates for various countries.

With the exception of China—a nation currently facing a liquidity crisis—most countries are fostering a monetary environment characterized by tightening, which helps keep inflation in check. Theoretically, this creates conditions that would allow these nations to sustain interest payments even if interest rates were to fall to zero.

The issue, however, is that until now, price stability has been maintained using commodities that represent only a small share of the total money supply (excluding oil and natural gas).

If the prices of oil and natural gas—commodities that account for a significant portion of the total money supply—begin to rise toward their "fair" value, most countries will inevitably find themselves in a situation similar to that of China.

In other words, if the prices of oil and natural gas—which hold a large share of the total money supply—increase, most nations would see their fiscal capacity to make interest payments completely exhausted long before reaching a zero-interest-rate environment, potentially leading to conditions akin to the Great Depression of 1929.

Looking back at the Great Depression, long-term interest rates in the United States hit a floor of 2.09%; they never even approached zero.

This suggests that, given the monetary policy environment of that era, the U.S. reached a point where excessive inflation completely depleted its capacity to service interest payments at the 2.09% level.

In conclusion, while it is theoretically possible for any nation to possess the fiscal capacity to sustain interest payments at a zero-interest-rate level, reaching such a state in reality is extremely difficult—a fact that underscores just how challenging it is for central banks to manage inflation. Therefore, among the countries shown in the chart of interest rate trends, those falling into the category of nations facing a high-level liquidity crisis—namely Switzerland, China, Thailand, Singapore, Japan, Taiwan, Sweden, and Denmark—will be the first to fall into a "great depression" (defined here as the loss of the ability to meet interest payments) if they fail to align their interest rate structures with that of the euro—which serves as a key benchmark—before the onset of a rise in oil and natural gas prices.



(원문)

이론적으로  중앙은행이 내릴수있는 금리하한수치는 제로금리입니다.

제로금리는  화폐시스템의원리상  국가가 재정적으로 감당할수있는 이자지급능력 완전고갈되는 영역을 의미합니다. 

문제는 제로금리에 도달할수있는 국가는  중앙은행의 통화정책기술이 높고 선진화된 국가만 가능하다는것입니다.

예)를 들어보겠습니다. 

국채금리는 통화량(유동성)개념이고,  정책금리는 인플레이션(CPI영역)개념입니다.

풀린통화량(국채금리)에대해서 = 적정한 인플레이션(정책금리)이 올때,  국가의 재정능력은  제로금리까지 도달할수있는 이자지급능력을 가지게됩니다.   

그런데.

풀린통화량(국채금리)에대해서 < 초과한 인플레이션 (정책금리)이 올때는 . 국가의 재정능력은 제로금리에 도달하기전 인플레이션에 의해 상실하게됩니다.

현재 ,중국의 국채금리(통화량개념)는 1.67% < 정책금리(인플레이션개념)는 3.0%입니다.  

중국의 재정능력이  제로금리까지 도달할수있는 여유자본을 가지고있다해도 , 초과된 인플레이션으로 인해서  구매력이 하락하면서  유동성이 감소되어 실제 사용가능한 국채금리는  1.67% - 1.33(초과금리)= 0.33%이고 이것이  중국의 실제 사용가능한 국채금리값이 되는것입니다.

그래서  앞으로 중국의 국채금리가  -0.33% 하락하게되면  국가의 재정상  이자지급여력이 완전고갈되는  제로금리에 놓이게된다는것입니다.

그림은 각국의 국채금리와 정책금리 자료입니다.

상위 유동성위기국가인 중국을 제외하고  나머지국가들은  긴축환경으로  적절한 물가억제환경을 만들면서  이론적으로 제로금리까지 이자지급능력을 펼칠수있는  금리환경을 조성하고있습니다.

문제는  지금까지는  유가나 천연가스를 제외한   총통화량에서  화폐점유율이 낮은재료를 가지고 적절한 물가환경을 유지해왔다는것이고,

유가와 천연가스가 가격상승하면서 적절한 가치에 도달하기 시작하면 거의 대부분의 국가는  중국과 같은 처지에 도달할수밖에 없다는것입니다.

즉, 총통화량에서 화폐점유율이 높은  유가와 천연가스가 상승하게되면 ,  제로금리에 도달하기전  거의 대부분의 국가가  재정상 이자지급능력이 완전고갈되면서 대공황(1929)과 같은 환경에 놓인다는것입니다. 

과거 1929년 대공황 시기의 미국의 장기금리를 보면 하한선이  2.09%가 한계였다는것이고 제로금리근처도 도달하지못했다는것입니다.

이는  이당시 미국의 통화정책환경이 2.09% 수준에서  초과인플레이션에따른 이자지금능력의 완전고갈이 발생했단 말할수있습니다.

결론적으로  이론적으론  모든국가가  제로금리에 도달할수있는  재정적 이자지급능력을 가지고있지만,  실제  제로금리에 도달하는것은 매우힘들며  이는 중앙은행의 인플레이션관리가 매우 힘들다는것을 증명합니다.

따라서,  그림의 각국 금리흐름에서 상위유동성 위기국가영역에 해당하는  국가(스위스,중국,태국,싱가폴,일본,타이완,스웨덴,덴마크)들은  유가와 천연가스상승시기가 오기전  기준이 되는 유로와 같은 금리체계를 가지지 못하면  

가장먼저  대공황(이자지급능력상실)에 놓이게 될것입니다......

2026년 10월 11일 일요일

Macroeconomic Conditions – October 11, 2026.

 



Because foreign exchange markets boast the largest liquidity volume on the planet,

both macroeconomic trends and the direction of central bank monetary policies are inevitably driven by the movement of exchange rates.

In other words, exchange rates dictate fluctuations in currency value and price levels, determine which regions of the world experience low or high inflation,

trigger capital flows, and shape the lifespan of economic cycles—ultimately determining the longevity of the entire monetary economic system.


Ultimately, just as the saying goes that "baseball is a pitcher's game," one could say that "the macroeconomic environment is a game of exchange rates."




The chart shows the trend of the Dollar Index.

Why is France currently pursuing austerity with such desperate intensity—effectively subjecting itself to severe economic hardship?

It is to stem the liquidity drain caused by the weakening Euro, a phenomenon resulting from the strengthening US dollar shown in the chart.


If France did not endure this self-imposed hardship to offset the liquidity shortfall through austerity measures in the face of a weak Euro,

the current strength of the dollar could not be sustained.

In essence, since a strong dollar is built upon the sacrifices of the nations that comprise the Dollar Index (the Eurozone, the UK, Japan, Canada, Sweden, and Switzerland),

if France cannot hold out, a strong dollar becomes impossible.

The problem, however, lies in France's current situation.

While the country is holding on by drastically slashing budgets for education and administrative agencies,

it is pushing past the limits of what the public is willing to tolerate. In other words, the dollar strength shown at point 3 in the chart is a trend driven largely by France’s self-inflicted austerity measures;

this implies that if France can no longer sustain such austerity and teeters on the brink of a liquidity crisis, the current dollar strength becomes unsustainable.

To put it another way,

Japan halted its own austerity measures—which had been triggered by a weak yen—back in July,

and now, there is a growing likelihood that France (representing the Eurozone) will also abandon its self-inflicted austerity.

Consequently, if France fails to prolong this environment of austerity, the euro will inevitably strengthen,

and the Dollar Index will inevitably shift toward a genuine decline, driven by the euro's appreciation.


​Now, let’s circle back to the beginning: I mentioned that "baseball is a game of pitching," just as the "macroeconomic environment is a game of exchange rates," didn't I?

So, what actually happens when the dollar weakens?


​From a macroeconomic perspective, the depreciation of currency value resulting from a weak dollar

is driving us all toward an inflationary inferno.

2026년 10월 4일 일요일

Status of the Dollar Index

 


Looking at the Dollar Index trend in the chart,

I initially thought the previous "fake" peak marked the final turning point toward a weaker dollar,

but in hindsight, the *real* peak is emerging only now.

Therefore, if the current peak is breached, the Dollar Index will likely plummet rapidly toward the 90 level.

Because the drop is very steep, it seems likely that it will simply pass through the Dollar Index 95–96 level, which is the growth benchmark for companies benefiting from high inflation.

Therefore, the high-inflation phase we are anticipating is likely to unfold much more abruptly than expected, catching market participants off guard.

October 4, 2026 – Macroeconomic Situation

 

France's current level of monetary tightening—measured by the spread between government bond yields and the benchmark interest rate—stands at -2.22, marking the highest level seen in the past five years.

Going a step further,

the French government is implementing fiscal consolidation measures totaling approximately €50 billion to €60 billion (roughly KRW 75 trillion to 90 trillion).

As a result,

the budgets of almost all ministries are being cut, including administrative and project budget controls for major ministries such as the Ministry of Education, the Ministry of Environment, and the Ministry of the Interior.


Furthermore, they are even going so far as to cut the sensitive education budget; this is an austerity policy that approaches the extreme limits of what France can currently implement. 


Protests, road blockades, and public transport strikes are ongoing as student groups, transport unions, teachers' unions, and far-left and opposition political factions join forces.


In addition,


harsher austerity measures are being signaled to reduce the current fiscal deficit ratio from 5% to the EU level of 3%.


All of this ultimately amounts to a desperate effort to prevent the weakening of the dollar index, and represents an austerity environment being imposed on all EU countries, extending beyond France.


The problem is that in Germany, another EU country, the remaining austerity capacity shown in the graph is gradually decreasing to -0.80, indicating that there is very little room left for tightening.


Looking at exchange rates,


Japan—which had previously strived to maintain the dollar's trading range—abandoned its policy of yen weakness starting in July,


leaving Canada and the Eurozone as the only ones still putting up a desperate fight.


The problem, however, is that—as evidenced by the budget cuts across all French government ministries—


the Eurozone is simply not in a position to sacrifice its currency value to support the dollar's trading range.



If you look at the current state of government bond yields across nations,


rising yields in the Eurozone, Japan, and the U.S. have driven monetary tightening to abnormally high peaks,


creating a situation where everyone is struggling under the weight of such aggressive tightening.



If these desperate, heart-wrenching efforts ultimately collapse, what kind of change will follow?


I suspect the answer lies in the as-yet-undetermined range of the Dollar Index shown in the chart.


2026년 9월 30일 수요일

Monetary Economic System and Population Change

 



화폐경제시스템과 인구변화
Monetary Economic System and Population Change

The United States emerged as the issuer of the world's reserve currency because the existing system of individual national currencies could no longer sustain excessive population growth, and because gold, which had served as a means of reducing debt burdens, was not accumulated in sufficient quantities by the major nations.


From a demographic perspective, if population decline in the future begins to resemble the conditions that existed during the period when Britain was the reserve-currency nation, I believe the role of the United States will eventually come to an end. More than 100 years from now, the world may transition toward a regional-state framework and a system based on individual national currencies.


The reason I illustrated such a dramatic population decline in the chart is that the current dollar-centered monetary system, led by the United States, requires significant sacrifices from individual countries. In particular, it exerts a negative influence across the societies of countries that play a role in determining the value of the U.S. Dollar Index.


Examples often cited include Japan's "Lost 30 Years" following the Plaza Accord, the prolonged stagnation of Europe, and the increasingly negative social atmosphere and decline in public morale seen across many developed countries.


Previously, I argued that the reserve-currency system must remain expansionary and that humanity could face a major crisis within the next century if it fails to expand into space. However, if the large-scale population restructuring and decline I anticipate actually occurs, then the dollar-centered monetary system led by the United States may no longer be necessary.


Ultimately, assuming population decline proceeds as expected, the end of America's role as the reserve-currency nation may occur more than a century from now, when individual countries have developed sufficient capacity to sustain and circulate their own monetary systems independently.


"Money is fair and does not discriminate. "






2026년 9월 29일 화요일

Conditions of a Future Advanced Nation (eng)


1. Advanced Nations of the Past: The Era When Colonial Expansion Sustained the Monetary System


For advanced nations of the past, colonial expansion was not merely a matter of territorial growth. It was an important condition for delaying the collapse of the monetary-economic system and extending the economic lifespan of the nation.


By acquiring new colonies, these nations gained access to inexpensive labor and abundant physical resources. From a monetary policy perspective, this helped restrain debt accumulation and inflationary pressures. As a result, the stability of the monetary system increased, allowing economic growth to be sustained for longer periods.


However, this approach could not last forever. The physical limits of territorial expansion, the intensification of military competition among nations, and the growing resistance within colonial regions gradually reduced the economic benefits that colonial expansion once provided. Ultimately, it failed to become a fundamental long-term solution for maintaining the monetary system and eventually disappeared into history.


2. Modern Advanced Nations: The Era When Monetary Policy Efficiency Became National Competitiveness


In the modern era, the core source of competitiveness shifted from colonial possession to the efficiency of a central bank's monetary policy.


Efforts to reduce corruption, strengthen legal and institutional frameworks, improve education, and cultivate civic responsibility created the foundation for maximizing monetary policy efficiency. Countries that succeeded in these areas were able to prolong the lifespan of their monetary systems and secure economic advantages.


In contrast, countries with lower monetary policy efficiency tended to serve as providers of relatively inexpensive labor and natural resources, remaining in a less developed position within the global economy.


However, this system also has its limitations. No matter how efficiently monetary policy is managed, it cannot completely overcome population growth that exceeds the system's carrying capacity, nor the limitations of policy coordination among central banks around the world.


As a result, challenges such as zero interest rates, excessive debt accumulation, and the exhaustion of monetary policy tools may become increasingly severe over time.


3. Future Advanced Nations: The Era When Energy Self-Sufficiency Determines Currency Value


In the future, the gap in renewable energy capacity and advanced technological development may become one of the most important standards of national competitiveness.


The large-scale deployment of renewable energy, especially solar power, can reduce a nation's dependence on externally sourced energy. In turn, this may lower the pressure to expand the money supply and help limit the growth of debt.


In other words, the divide between nations that achieve energy self-sufficiency through renewable energy and those that remain dependent on imported energy may continue to widen.


Countries that establish energy-independent systems such as RE100-based infrastructures could maintain relatively stable currency values. Meanwhile, countries with high dependence on energy imports may experience persistent cost increases and weakening currency values.


As a consequence, differences in currency value between nations could expand, leading to wider exchange-rate gaps and potentially creating a new standard by which future developed and developing nations are distinguished.


Conditions for Survival During a Crisis Comparable to the Great Depression


If a future period of large-scale deflation or a new type of economic depression emerges, widespread corporate bankruptcies and contraction of the financial system could cause a sharp decline in the amount of money circulating throughout the economy.


Under such conditions, traditional energy industries such as nuclear power, oil, and natural gas, which rely on continuous capital investment and ongoing monetary circulation, could face severe contraction and structural challenges.


In contrast, renewable energy sectors such as solar power require relatively little ongoing monetary expenditure after the initial installation phase and offer the possibility of energy self-sufficiency. This characteristic may increase their resilience during prolonged economic crises.


Ultimately, in a large-scale deflationary environment, systems that require continuous monetary consumption to function may become less competitive than systems that can produce energy independently with lower monetary dependence.


Countries that rely heavily on external resources are inherently more vulnerable to economic shocks. By comparison, countries capable of producing and supplying their own energy can provide greater protection for their economic systems against external disruptions.


This suggests that future national competitiveness may not be determined solely by financial and monetary policy capabilities. It could become closely linked to a nation's ability to maintain energy self-sufficiency even during periods of severe economic stress.


In other words, the advanced nations of the future may not simply be the wealthiest nations. Rather, they may be the nations that secure a high degree of energy independence, allowing them to sustain themselves through financial crises and economic depressions.

2026년 9월 20일 일요일

"Solar Power: The Ultimate Inflation Hedge and Self-Sufficient Energy"

 Since 2009, the only sector where currency depreciation has not occurred is solar polysilicon.

The unique advantage of solar energy is that it allows self-sufficiency in energy without currency consumption. In times of economic stability, this value is not fully recognized, but when the economy collapses or enters a Great Depression where market liquidity dries up, this material demonstrates its true worth.


For example, based on the current interest rate structure, within roughly five years we may face exhausted central bank rate capacity and fiscal depletion, leading to a Great Depression. In such a depression, bankruptcies will drastically reduce total money supply, interest rates will soar, and although energy exists, the currency available to consume it will be insufficient. In that scenario, only companies, nations, or individuals preparing for the future with initiatives like RE100 will be able to maintain their energy consumption through self-sufficient solar energy without currency.


Why should we invest in solar and polysilicon companies?

Since 2009, there has been no currency depreciation in this sector, making it the highest-value material for inflation hedging, with potential growth of at least 100x.


In the macroeconomic environment, large-scale capital shifts take time, so individuals have a rare chance to seize the bottom early.


Within the next five years, we may enter a 100-year cycle Great Depression. Nuclear, oil, and natural gas consumption all require currency, but solar does not — leading to an energy wealth gap.


Future central bank monetary policy will inevitably reduce excessive currency allocation to fossil fuels. Over the next century, solar will play a crucial role in the energy landscape, making now the most ideal investment timing.


Representative Companies

Solar polysilicon: Wacker, OCI Holdings (expansion into space solar power)


Solar energy: Hanwha Solutions, First Solar


TIP: Why exclude Chinese solar companies?

Because of China’s exhausted interest rate capacity and the possibility of a destructive, preemptive economic crisis.


Because of heightened geopolitical risks, particularly the potential instability surrounding Taiwan.

Macroeconomic Market Conditions (September 21, 2026)


 If you look closely at the chart of exchange rate movements, you’ll notice that among all the countries, Japan has borne the greatest sacrifice in maintaining the dollar index range through currency weakness.

Countries like the Eurozone, Switzerland, and the UK have moved below the dollar index range, so in reality, over the past three years, the dollar’s movement has relied most heavily on Japan, alongside Canada.

But on July 27, the long-standing trend of yen weakness collapsed, and the yen shifted into a strengthening phase. As a result, the short-term dollar rally also broke down, leaving the dollar index range increasingly unstable.

Why did the yen’s weakness collapse?

Let’s calculate. The three indicators with the strongest impact on inflation are:

  1. Exchange rate → 100% effect

  2. Crude oil & natural gas → 40–50% effect

  3. Government bond yields → 20–30% effect

Japan, in order to support dollar strength, endured inflation caused by yen weakness (+100% from exchange rates). It tried to offset this with tighter monetary policy through bond yield increases (–30%).

The net effect was about +70% inflation, which Japan had to absorb.



Looking at Japan’s policy rate trends in the chart, since 2024 Japan has acknowledged this +70% inflation through frequent rate hikes. But this also triggered reduced purchasing power and liquidity risks.

Why did Japan abandon yen weakness on July 27?

Because inflation had become unbearable, and the risk of a liquidity crisis was too great. Japan could no longer sacrifice itself for the dollar index range.

By shifting to yen strength, Japan aimed to suppress inflation through exchange rates. This gave the country breathing room, allowing it to pause the cycle of repeated short-term rate hikes.

What does this mean for the dollar going forward?

Japan, once the biggest influence on maintaining the dollar index range, is no longer able to sustain inflation and rate hikes caused by yen weakness. Since July 27, Japan has turned toward yen strength to fight inflation.

This means the strength of the yen will now directly determine the weakness of the dollar.

On top of that, the Eurozone has raised rates, adding to inflationary pressures. The U.S. Federal Reserve also raised rates on September 16. Everywhere, inflation is causing turmoil.



The critical point

Looking at government bond yields and policy rates in the chart, the U.S. has been maintaining excessively high rates above the fair trend line due to prolonged dollar strength.

But to avoid a fiscal collapse, the U.S. must bring bond yields and policy rates back down to around 1%, which is the safe level. This implies that rate cuts are necessary.

Conclusion

Currently, countries are overusing rate hikes to maintain the dollar index range. This is not a normal interest rate cycle and harms fiscal health.

Therefore, the dollar index range is bound to collapse sooner or later.

Would you like me to refine this into a more analytical essay style, or keep it as a market commentary piece that reads like a financial analyst’s note?

2026년 9월 17일 목요일

A brutal test of endurance.

 


From February 23, 2026, the U.S. entered a phase of monetary tightening (where Treasury yields exceeded the Federal Reserve’s policy rate).


The reason is that individual countries no longer have enough flexibility in their exchange rates or interest rates to weaken their currencies and thereby sustain a strong U.S. dollar. They cannot bear the sacrifices required to do so.


As a result, the U.S. itself has been compensating for the lack of global liquidity by tightening through higher Treasury yields relative to the policy rate. At one point, the tightening gap reached about -1.25 (Treasury yield minus policy rate). However, after the Fed raised its policy rate (acknowledging inflation), the tightening intensity weakened to about -0.95.


This means the U.S. is now in a situation where it cannot tighten beyond -0.95. Going forward, the tightening strength will likely remain somewhere between 0 and -0.95. Once it reaches a point in that range where U.S. liquidity is fully exhausted, the dollar’s support will collapse, and the economy may enter a phase of dollar weakness combined with high inflation.


Interest Rate Environments by Country (Excel)

Therefore, by monitoring the daily tightening strength in the interest rate environment across countries, you can see how much it weakens over time. Eventually, you’ll notice when the U.S. tightening capacity is completely depleted, which could mark the beginning of a breakdown in the dollar’s stability.


Tip: In the Excel file, refresh the query menu daily to update with the latest data. Make sure your cursor is placed in the C column (tightening strength) when refreshing.


If your goals and dreams are tied to the scenario of dollar weakness and high inflation, then the endgame is near. It may be difficult, but holding onto the hope that the conclusion is approaching could bring a more positive future.



Write the answer to the problem in the comments.

 


TIP.1

a) Excess Inflation Environment

10-Year Treasury Yield (Money Supply & Liquidity Indicator) < Base Interest Rate (Inflation Indicator)

b) Optimal Price Environment

10-Year Treasury Yield (Money Supply & Liquidity Indicator) = Base Interest Rate (Inflation Indicator)

c) Tightening & Deflation Environment

10-Year Treasury Yield (Money Supply & Liquidity Indicator) > Base Interest Rate (Inflation Indicator)

TIP.2

d) Currency appreciation -> Liquidity-increasing effect; Ex. 1) Increased purchasing power, lower commodity prices (based on oil and natural gas)

e) Currency depreciation -> Liquidity-decreasing effect; Ex. 1) Decreased purchasing power, higher commodity prices (based on oil and natural gas)


TIP.3


TIP.4


US Interest Rate Hike on September 16 (Revealing the Limits of Monetary Tightening)

After the intensity of tightening rose from 0 to 1.25 between February 2026 and the period leading up to the hike,

the September 16 rate hike resulted in a tightening intensity of 0.95, marking a weakening of the stance.

Consequently,

it has become impossible for the spread between the 10-year Treasury yield and the benchmark interest rate (representing tightening intensity) to exceed 0.95 in the US.

Going forward, if the dollar weakens and tightening intensity drops below 0.95, US liquidity could be completely depleted, potentially causing the "Dollar Box Range 3" to collapse.

(Currently, the remaining US liquidity headroom lies within the 0 to 0.95 range.)



Question: When will the "Dollar Box Range 3" collapse and the Dollar Index reach the 90–95 level?


Please work out your own answer and post it in the comments.





2026년 9월 16일 수요일

Federal Reserve Rate Hike – Exposing the Limits



The Federal Reserve raised its benchmark interest rate at 3:00 a.m. today.


Most people interpret a rate hike as monetary tightening, but in reality it signals something else: the Fed is acknowledging inflation, and that inflationary pressure is intensifying.


Government bond yields are closely tied to liquidity and money supply, while the benchmark interest rate reflects the strength of inflation. So when the Fed raises rates, it is essentially admitting that inflation in the CPI domain has risen.


Impact on the Market

Rising inflation weakens purchasing power and reduces market liquidity. Prices go up while the money supply remains the same, making existing liquidity feel smaller.


Because inflation reduces liquidity, it implies that another action will follow to restore balance — namely, a decline in government bond yields to inject liquidity back into the market.


Currently, U.S. Treasury yields have surged to 5%. That rise has already created a tightening environment by draining liquidity. But with the Fed’s rate hike (inflation acknowledgment), bond yields now face only one direction: downward.


Why? Because lowering bond yields is the mechanism to replenish liquidity. Yet that same liquidity injection will strengthen inflation, creating a cycle of repeated bond yield declines and renewed inflationary pressure.


Weakening Tightening Power

Since December last year, the Fed has pursued strong tightening (bond yields rising while rates were lower). The larger the gap between yields and rates, the stronger the tightening effect.


But now, by raising rates, the Fed has admitted inflation and reduced its tightening strength. U.S. tightening intensity has fallen to -0.96, weaker than Italy (-1.73) or France (-1.83). In other words, the Fed has revealed its limited tightening capacity.


This exposes the Fed’s inability to maintain the dollar index range for long. As central bank tightening power weakens, stronger bond yield cuts will be required to restore liquidity, which in turn intensifies inflation.


What Comes Next?

Here is the key principle: when prices of essential goods reach their fair value relative to the expanded money supply, inflation stops.


Therefore, if the Fed realizes its tightening capacity is too weak, it faces a dilemma: how to contain inflation triggered by bond yield cuts. The answer lies in driving certain commodity prices explosively higher until they reach that “fair value.” Only then can inflation stabilize.


That means oil, natural gas, and solar-grade polysilicon — commodities whose prices have been suppressed since 2009 — may need to surge dramatically to halt runaway inflation.


Conclusion

The Fed’s latest rate hike shows its tightening ability is far weaker than expected. The dollar’s trading range is about to break, signaling the onset of a genuine dollar downtrend.

2026년 9월 14일 월요일

The Chosen Ones

 


The diagram illustrates the lifecycle of interest rates and the direction in which they move.


Right now, we are at point ⑦ Current location, and soon we will reach ⑥ near-zero interest rates, where national fiscal capacity becomes completely depleted. At that stage, the system enters a Great Depression—a restructuring environment.


Why has history repeatedly forced us through painful restructuring during depressions?

Because the gold-standard monetary system (point ④) requires debt reduction. To achieve this, society must undergo strict adjustments to match the system’s limited capacity.


The problem begins here

By the year 2000, policymakers already knew that the debt-expansion model was nearing its end. To survive, both they and the majority of people worldwide would have to accept that, once the depression begins, large-scale restructuring is unavoidable. This means cutting away bloated, corrupt, or unproductive parts of the system—whether in governments, corporations, or individuals. Only then can the system transition smoothly into a debt-reducing gold-standard environment.


How is a restructuring environment created?

It’s simple:


First, generate hyperinflation.


Then, abruptly shift into deflation.


People who adapted to soaring prices during hyperinflation will be unable to withstand the shock of deflation. As a result, many will be eliminated in the restructuring process.


Example:  

Real estate prices are skyrocketing. To buy property, people take on massive long-term debt (20–30 years). But when the depression hits, deflation will drive property values down for at least five years. Liquidity will tighten, interest rates will spike, and bankruptcies will spread across individuals, companies, and banks. It is expected that about 60% of total money supply (M2) will vanish, and real estate prices could fall to less than half their current value.


Why hyperinflation is necessary

Hyperinflation and soaring asset prices create the extreme volatility needed for restructuring. When the collapse comes, no one can withstand it, making the elimination process easier. That’s why global inflation records are being pushed higher and higher—it must continue until the depression begins. Only then will the system meet the strict conditions required for debt reduction under a gold-standard framework.


How is hyperinflation engineered?

It cannot be achieved simply by printing excessive money, because that would destroy advanced economies and blur the line between rich and poor. Instead, the process works like this:


Since 2009: Liquidity is steadily expanded while maintaining a strong dollar. At the same time, prices of key commodities (like oil and gas) are artificially suppressed. This builds up excess liquidity without triggering inflation.


When dollar strength can no longer be maintained: The dollar weakens sharply. Oil and gas prices—long suppressed—explode upward. This unleashes the stored liquidity all at once, creating hyperinflation.


The cycle ahead

As the dollar weakens and interest rates converge toward zero, hyperinflation will erupt. Once fiscal capacity is exhausted, the Great Depression begins.


The hidden logic of survival

Even if I explain this in detail, only a tiny fraction of people will truly understand. The system does not eliminate 100% of humanity—it requires a certain number of survivors.


This is why conspiracy theories exist. They are not created by individuals, but by those who run the system. They serve as hints for the people who must survive. Those who grasp the clues adapt and endure; those who don’t are eliminated.


In summary

When the dollar finally shifts into weakness, hyperinflation will intensify until the depression begins. Only a small number of people will recognize the pattern and survive the restructuring. These are the Chosen Ones.


This translation keeps the dramatic tone of your original writing while making it more accessible to an English-speaking audience.


2026년 9월 12일 토요일

Market Outlook for the Week of September 13, 2026 (9월13일다음주 시황)

 금리로  각국의 통화정책환경을 알수있는데 

우선 알아야할것은 

국채금리는 통화량과 밀접하며

중앙은행의 기준금리는 인플레이션과 밀접하다는것입니다. 


따라서, 조건을 만들어보면,

1)국채금리 = 기준금리는    풀린통화량대비 적정한 인플레이션환경이 되고 

2)국채금리 > 기준금리는    풀린통화량대비  디플레이션환경(긴축)

3)국채금리 < 기준금리는    풀린통화량대비 초과된  인플레이션환경(과도한 인플레이션-터키식)된다고했습니다.


​여기서 2)의 긴축및 디플레이션환경은

간단하게  시간을 끌거나 버티기 개념으로    

현재의 상황을  계속 유지하고싶을때  필요한 환경(시장의 고통과인내력요구)이고 

중앙은행이 일정기간 시장의 유동성을   축소및 격리하는 형태가 됩니다.   


그림은  2025년12월과 2026년 9월 의  각국가의  국채금리와 기준금리 변화흐름입니다.

국채금리 > 기준금리 조건이  긴축및 디플레이션환경이고,

현상황을 계속 유지할때  필요하다고했습니다.  

그림을 보시면  대부분의   개별국들은  강력한 긴축강도를 유지해왔다는것이고 

여기서 달러박스권 유지에 중요한 영향력을 행사하는  유로연합과  일본이 

통화약세와 더불어  금리적으로  장기간  강력한 긴축환경(국채금리>기준금리)을 유지해왔다는것입니다.


​하지만 

최근  마지막 까지  통화약세로 버티던 일본의 환율 포지션이 무너지면서 엔화강세로 선회했고 오른쪽 그림처럼 유로는  인플레이션으로 인한  기준금리인상을 실행하므로인해서  긴축강도를 결정하는 금리차이의 축소로인한 긴축환경이약화되었다는것입니다.

이말은   

 달러박스권유지를 위한   개별국의 긴축환경이 환율(통화강세)와 기준금리인상으로  약화되고있다는것이고 공은 다시 미국으로 넘어가서  마지막으로 남아있는  해결책은  미국자신이 긴축환경(국채금리>기준금리)으로 진입하는것이됩니다.  

그래서  

그림을 보시면   작년 12월 미국의 긴축강도는 국채금리-기준금리 =  - 0.39 수준이었는데   개별국의 긴축약화로 인해서 2026년 9월 11일 현재  국채금리-기준금리 =  - 1.22 수준으로 긴축강도가 급격히 증가했다는것입니다.

그러면 그동안  잘버티던  유로나 일본의 긴축환경이 약화될때 

미국자신은 어디까지 더 긴축강도를 높혀야  달러박스권을 유지할수있을까요?  

그림을 보시면 그동안    유로국가중  강력한 긴축을 행사중인 국가는  이탈리아와 프랑스입니다.최대긴축강도를 - 1.7에서 -1.8 수준에서  장기간 유지하는 것을 보면  이부근이  이들이 만들어낼수있는 긴축의 한계값이라는것이고  어쩌면  앞으로 미국의 긴축강도 역시 -1.7~ -1.8까지의 만들어야 현재의 달러박스권을 유지할수있다는것입니다. 


그림은 미국의 국채금리와 기준금리흐름인데 

미국이 달러박스권유지를 위해  강력한 긴축을 하려할때  

최소한 프랑스와 이탈리아수준으로 긴축강도를 얻으려면, 

첫째,국채금리를 현상황에서 전고점을 넘어서서 계속 인상 시켜야하고 

둘째 ,기준금리를 현상황에서 계속  인하환경을 만들어야한다는것입니다.

그런데,

미국의 국채금리가 계속 상승하려면  시장의 유동성을 축소시킬수있는 유동성의 여유가 있어야하고 유동성의 여유란  강력한 달러강세환경에서 만들어진다는것입니다.

문제는  달러가 계속 박스권을 강력하게 지지하는 상황이기때문에 

미국의 국채금리역시 유동성여력의 부족으로  전고점돌파가 불가능한 상태라는것이고  

긴축강화를 위해 남아있는 유일한  방법은  기준금리를 인하할수있는 환경이 필요하다는것입니다. 


그런데  지금  미국에서는 긴축강도를 약화시킬수있는   기준금리인상 이야기가  뉴스에서 흘러나오고있죠?

결국에는   현재 미국의 긴축강도인  -1.22 수준이  

미국이 당장 만들어낼수있는 한계값일 가능성이 높다는것이고 

ㄱ) 미국이 앞으로 기준금리인상으로  긴축강도를 약화시키거나 

ㄴ) 미국의 국채금리가 점고점을 넘지 못하고 우물쭈물 하게된다면 

이에 따른  긴축강도의 약화와 인플레이션강화로 인해서 

달러인덱스의 박스권이 붕괴( 달러약세 추세전환)하면서  

우리는 본격적인  달러약세의 초고물가영역(하이퍼급)으로 진입하게된다는것입니다.


 따라서, 다음주 주시해야할것은  

미국긴축강도의 방향성을 결정하는   


기준금리인상여부(긴축포기)와 2) 전고점을 돌파하는  국채금리인상의 강도(전고점을 크게넘지못할시 긴축붕괴)가 되겠습니다.


​


 





 





2026년 9월 11일 금요일

Core Inflation (근원물가)

 

오늘 뉴스를 보면  미국시간 11일 발표한   근원소비자물가가 예상보다 높기때문에  중앙은행의 정책금리인상 가능성이 높게 관측된다고 합니다.  

여기서 근원소비자 물가는  변동성이 큰 식품과에너지를 제외한 물가 지표입니다.

그런데  여기서  우리가  주목해야하는것은  

표에 파란 선이  에너지와 식품을 제외한 근원 소비자 물가지수인데 

"변동성이 거의 없다"는것입니다.

근원물가는  변동성이 거의 적기때문에  

그림의 기존미국연준의 금리방향성과는 거의 관계가 없이  일정하게 움직여왔다는것입니다.


다시 

미국의 근원소비자물가상승률을 보시면  

2022년 최고점을 찍은후  무려 6%수준에서 2.4%수준의 경기침체수준까지 내려와있기때문에  만약 근원물가로  기준금리를 결정해야 한다면 

정상적인 사고방식을 가지는 사람이라면 

시장은 이미  물가 하락의 경기침체 구간이기때문에   기준금리를 인하할수밖에 없다는것입니다.

즉, 뉴스에서는  근원물가때문에   기준금리인상 가능성이 90%까지 높아졌다 말하고있는데   설사  연준이 기준금리를 인상한다하더라도  이는   근원물가의 경기침체를 더 가속화하는 악수가 된다는것입니다.


지난 2026년 6월 18일(한국 시간 6월 19일 새벽) FOMC 정례회의에서 

케빈 워시(Kevin Warsh) 연준 의장은 점도표(Dot Plot) 제출을 거부하며 

"시장의 방향성을 연준의 힌트에 의존하기보다 실제 경제 데이터와 시장 신호를 직접 보고 판단한다"라는 메시지를 명확히 했습니다.

"연준은   자신의 생각을 철저하게 감추고있다"는것입니다. 

이런 이해관계를 종합하면 

결국   유가가 상승할수록  모든유동성이 원자재수요에 몰리기때문에  

실제 경기침체는 가속화한다는것이고 

유가상승환경에서 낮아지는 물가지표와 이에따른 경제침체화로  결국  

장기적으로 기준금리인하를  더욱더 강화해야만 하는  상황에 몰린다는것입니다.


이전 분석에서 금리가 어떻게 작동하는지 알려드렸죠? 

지금의 화폐시스템은 통화량이 증가할때 부채가 증가하고 화폐가치가 하락하기때문에 

점진적 금리인하 추세를 가지며   제로금리에 도달할때  국가의 재정여력이 바닥을 보이면서 시스템이 작동이  멈추면서 대공황상황으로 진입한다고했습니다.


즉, 우리가 살아가는 경제환경은 부채증가와 화페가치하락으로인해서    

점진적 금리인하환경을 가지고있기때문에  

결국  제로금리에 수렴하는것은 자연적 현상이라는것입니다.

그래서, 금리의 장기적흐름으로보면  

현재의  미국 국채금리나 기준금리가   단기적으로  비정상적인 금리상승을 보이고있지만 

앞으로 미국이 재정적으로 붕괴되지않으려면   

현재의 부채에 기반한  가치가 없는 화폐에대해서

더이상   더많은 이자율을 줄수없다는것이고  

화폐의적정가치가 1%부근이기때문에   중앙은행의 정책금리인하및 국채금리인하를 더욱더 가속화해야만 하는상황에 몰리고있다는것입니다.


​


  

2026년 9월 9일 수요일

How Interest Rates Work (금리가 작동하는원리)

 

그림은  금리(국채금리기준)가 작동하는 원리의  간단한예시입니다.

그림을 보시면  대략적인 이해를 할수있는데 

여기서 우리가 핵심적으로 이해해야하는것은 

국채금리는  통화공급량(유동성)과 밀접하며 제로금리부근에 도달할때 부채증가로인해서 국가의 재정이 고갈되어  시스템 작동이 멈추게된다는것입니다. 

(대공황=제로금리부근=국가재정능력고갈= 시스템작동멈춤)

이러한 이해관계를 잘이해하면  응용능력이 생기는데 

제로금리는  어디까지나  이론적 결과물이라는것이고  

실제는  "제로금리부근에 도달하기전 이미 국가재정능력이 고갈될수있다"는것입니다.

 조건 예)  국채금리 < 중앙은행 정책금리 일때,

 인플레이션(CPI영역)에 기반해서  중앙은행의 정책금리가 움직이는데,  

정책금리가 국채금리를 초과해서  과도하게 커지게되면 

정책금리를 추종하는 CPI영역의 과도한 인플레이션에 따른 전체 구매력 약화로인해서    

제로금리에 도달하기전에 화폐시스템의 작동이 멈추면서 1) 대공황으로 진입하거나  2)과도한 통화공급량에 따른 터키및 아르헨티나와 같은  금리폭등을유발할수있습니다.   

실전 예) 

중국  국채금리 1.67%   <   중앙은행정책금리 3.0%  

3.0%-1.67  = 중국은  + 1.33% 만큼 초과된 정책금리및 인플레이션환경 

여기서, 이론적으로  국채금리와 중앙은행의 정책 금리가 서로 같아야   

제로금리부근의 한계영역에 도달 국가의  재정이 고갈되는데  

+1.33%의 초과 정책금리및 인플레이션환경 때문에  

중앙은행의 미래 재정적 여력(유동성)이 감소한다는것이고, 

현재 중국에 남아있는 재정적 여력은 

국채금리 1.67% - 초과된 정책금리및 인플레이션 1.33% = 0.34% 이고,  

앞으로 중국에서  국채금리가  0.34%만큼  하락할때  이과정에서 국가의 재정이 고갈되어 

1)대공황에 진입 또는 2) 터키및아르헨티나와 같은 초고물가환경에 놓이게됩니다.

결국  예제를 풀어볼때  중국은  굉장히 위험한  유동성위기국가이고 

언제든지  위기를  회피하기위한  거대한 자본유출이 발생할수있는 국가가됩니다.....



2026년 9월 7일 월요일

Conditions of a future advanced nation (미래 선진국의 조건)


 1) 과거에는 

     식민지확장이 "화폐경제시스템 붕괴예방과 수명연장"을위한 

     선진국의 필수조건이었는데 

    영토확장에따른 식민지의 비용이 싼  노동력과 물적자원환경은 

    통화정책상  부채증가억제와 인플레이션억제효과을 유발

    화폐경제 시스템의 붕괴를 지연시키고 수명을연장하는 효과를 나타냄 

    하지만  

    영토확장의 지역적-물리적제약 및 군사경쟁 및  식민지반발등으로  

    장기적으로   긍정적 통화정책 효과를 얻지못하고 사라짐.

2) 현대에는 

    중앙은행의 통화정책이 극한의 효율성(부정부패억제,법정비,국민성개선,교육등등)을 

    가지고 화폐시스템의 수명을 연장하고 붕괴를 예방하는 조건으로   

    선진국의 움직임이 결정되었는데  

    이는 통화정책효율성이 낮은 환율적 후진국의 국가가  

    노동력과 물적자원을 지원하는 형태로 발전시킴. 

   하지만,  

  아무리 통화정책의 효율성을 극대화 시키더라도  시스템용량을 초과하는 과도한 

  인구환경과 중앙은행간 통화정책조율의한계성때문에 

 금리고갈(제로금리)및 부채한계를 막을수없다는것입니다.   

3)미래에는  

   재생에너지(태양광등등)와 관련첨단기술의 격차로 인해서 이로 절감되는 

  중앙은행의  통화공급량 억제 능력과 부채증가 억제 능력이  선진국의 핵심 조건 

  자급자족(예-RE100)의 재생에너지로  통화공급량을 최대한 억제한 국가와  그렇치 못한 국가는  화폐가치 격차로 인해서  환율이 붕괴 선진국과 후진국으로 강제적으로 나뉠수밖에 없다는것.


결국 미래에는  

재생에너지(태양광)의  설치규모에 따른 자급자족에너지로  

중앙은행의 통화공급량감소와 부채증가억제가  

화폐가치의 변화와  환율격차를 만들면서  선진국과 후진국을 결정짓는  기준이될수있고,

다른한편으론, 대공황의 디플레이션에서  선진국의  유일한자급자족 생존수단이될수있음. 

 

화폐소비율이 높은 원유와 천연가스의 대체제 ->태양광 폴리실리콘 

앞으로 한정된 중앙은행의 통화공급량 제약으로인해서 

현재의 원유와 천연가스의 시장규모를 대체하는  태양광영역의 폭발적 성장이 다가오고있는데  

이에따라서 

현재 태양광 기업의 가치는   매우 저가이고  미약하지만  

가까운 미래  달러약세의 고물가영역에 진입하게되면  

태양광기업은 엔비디아 및애플 또는  엑손모밀시가총액수준으로  커질수밖에 없는 구조를 가짐.

 


Problems in macroeconomics (거시경제학의문제점)

IQ와학력이 높고 

경제에관련된  공부을 많이하고 

관련된 직업을 가지고있어도 

대부분의 사람들은  거시경제를 이해할수있는  "확장된 시야"를  얻지 못합니다.


즉, 거시경제를 이해하지못하는 대부분의 사람들이 쓴 경제책을 가지고 

많은 사람들이 아무리 노력해서  공부해 봤자  얻는것은  아무것도 없다는것입니다.


그래서   지구상에 존재하는 인간중  극단적인 소수의 사람만이 

 거시경제를 이해할수있는 "확장된 시야"를 가지고있으며 

이는 아마도  대부분  무리및집단적영역에서의  잘못된 지식의 전염이나 세뇌에 기인하지않나 싶습니다.


그럼  거시경제를 이해하는것은  정말 어려운 것일까요? 

-> 오히려 너무 간단하고 쉽다는것이 거시경제학의 본질입니다.

" 화페경제시스템의 붕괴예방과 수명연장" 

모든 거시경제의방향성과 흐름은  위의 한문장에 만족하기위해 파생되고 유추됩니다.

문장하나만  뇌에서 각인시켜놓으면  모든 경제현상을 파악하고 연결할수있다는것입니다.


예)를 하나 들어보겠습니다.
거시경제의 모든 방향성을 결정하는 화폐경제시스템이 
유동성위기로 붕괴되지않으려면 
반드시 1)통화공급량(MONEY)이 점점적으로 증가해야한다는것입니다.  

통화공급량(MONEY)이 점진적으로 증가해야만  시스템이 붕괴되지않고 
수명을 연장을 할수있는데, 
문제는  통화공급량이 증가할때  부채, 금리,환율,물가 가  본격적으로 따라움직인다는것입니다.

즉,  통화공급량증가에서  파생된  부채,금리,환율,물가 역시 결국  시스템의 붕괴예방과 수명연장의 규칙에 만족해야한다는것이고  이흐름을  연결할수있는 "광범위하고  넓은 시야"만 가진다면  어쩌면  초등학교  아이들수준의 공부능력만으로도  거시경제를 쉽게 풀수있다는것입니다.



결국 거시경제라는것은  
간단하게 "화페경제시스템의 붕괴예방과 수명연장" 에 만족하기위한 "설계"영역이라는것입니다. 

예)로들면  전세계 경제를 이끌고있는 미국의 화폐시스템은  수명이 100년 정도입니다.
그래서  통화공급량과 이에따라 파생되는  부채, 금리,환율,물가영역의  수명역시 100년이라는것이고 100년을지나 수명이 고갈되면  대공황의 구조조정과정을 거쳐서 시스템의 다시 시작하면된다는것입니다.



따라서,  "화폐경제시스템의 붕괴예방과 수명연장"에 만족하기위해서 
통화공급량,부채, 금리, 환율, 물가영역을  100년을 목표로  설계하다보면  위의그림형태를 만들수있다는것이고 , 이러한 설계방향성은  초등학교수준의 지식수준만 있으면 누구나 그려낼수있다는것입니다.

다만,  제가 처음에  "대부분의 사람들(99.9999999999%)은   
거시경제를 이끌고 있는 화폐경제시스템을  이해할수없다"고 했죠? 
바로  " 확장된 시야"가  없기때문입니다.

하버드 대학교 경제학과 교수수준이나,  Mankiw 정도면  쉽게 거시경제의 흐름을 알수있지않나 생각하시는분들이 계시겠지만  이분들의 "확장된 시야" 역시  100년수명에 맞쳐 설계된 영역을 충분히  이해하기란  불가능에 가깝다는것입니다.(설계당사자가아니기때문)
결국 거시경제를 정확히 이해하지 못하는 분들때문에  여러분들의 뇌가  세뇌되고 전염되어  99.999999999%의 감옥에 갇혀있는것입니다.

그래서,자신이  99.99999999 %에 속해있다고 믿는 분들은 
어짜피 오랜시간 공부를 하건 경제학책을 읽던   "확장된 시야"를 얻을수없기때문에  최종적으로 시간낭비만 하고있는 셈이됩니다.


그럼 거시경제를 이해할수있는" 확장된 시야"를  얻을려할대  누가 가장 유리할까요? 


1) 순수함을 가지고있는  아이들.
2) 경제적으로 벼랑끝에 몰리고  생과사를 결정해야하는   절박함을 가지고있는 사람들.(Majors or Beggars)


"확장된 시야"를 얻는 대부분의 사람들은  1)2)에서 결정됩니다.

여러분들은 어디에 위치해 있읍니까?




 



  



2026년 6월 15일 월요일